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When I was asked to review the book, I was excit-
ed because there is a need to explicitly outline the 
enhancement discourse through a disability stud-
ies lens and especially to show the utility of dis-
ability studies analysis for other academic fields. 
On the other hand, it is also important to show the 
impact of arguments used in the enhancement dis-
course of other academic fields and, for that mat-
ter, outside the academic discourse on the argu-
ments used in disability studies and on the lifes of 
disabled people.2 Although literature covering the 
topic of enhancement through a disability studies 
lens has existed for some time, the amount of lit-
erature is much less than the literature around ethi-
cal issues linked to enhancement themes.
1 overview
The German-language book has four sections: 
Leitbegriffe, Behinderung als Erfahrungsraum, 
Normativität and Ethik von Enhancement [Key 
Concepts, Disability as a Space of Experience, 
Normativity, and Ethics of Enhancement].
Section one covers issues such as the problem 
of technology assessment that focusses on futur-
istic claims of envisioned technologies and their 
impact on society at the expense of discussing the 
here and now of what leads to the demand (Alfred 
Nordman); the meaning of a good life and human 
nature, where Christina Schües, among others, 
concludes that “die Hierarchisierung von Eigen-
schaftszuschreibungen oder eine angenommene 
Zentralität von einer menschlichen Natur nicht 
die Grundlage für ethische Entscheidungen sein 
kann” (p. 58) [the hierarchization of assigned pro-
perties or an assumed centrality of human nature 
cannot be the basis for ethical decisions]. Chris-
toph Rehmann-Sutter put forward the view that 
the desire for enhancement can be better discussed 
within the framework of a good life than an ethics 
of rights and duty: “Man kann das Wünschbare 
an den Enhancement-Biotechnologien im Kontext 
einer Ethik des guten Lebens besser diskutieren 
als in einer Ethik der Rechte und Pflichten” (p. 
63), and that disability studies must be included 
in this philosophical discussion of the desirability 
of enhancement in bioethics: “Dass es für diese 
philosophische Klärung der Wünschbarkeit von 
Enhancement in der Bioethik heute unverzichtbar 
ist, die Disability Studies einzubeziehen, ist der 
zweite Teil der These.” (p. 64)
Section two covers “Bedingungen für ein 
gutes Leben mit Behinderung” [Conditions for 
a good life with a disability] (Katrin Grüber); 
“Lehren aus der Geschichte des Cochlea-Im-
plantats” [Lessons from the history of the Coch-
lear implant] (Stuart Blume); “Konstruktion und 
Dekonstruktion von Gehörlosigkeit bei Kindern” 
[Construction and deconstruction of deafness in 
children] (Sigrid Bosteels and Stuart Blume).
Section three is about “Embodiment, En-
hancement und Normativität” [Embodiment, en-
hancement and normativity] (Jackie Leach Scul-
ly); “Normative und selektive Implikationen der 
Prothetik nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg” [Norma-
tive and selective implications of prosthetics af-
ter the First World War] (Miriam Eilers); “Post-
humane Verkörperungen in einer Post-Gender 
Welt? Kulturelle Dimensionen der kosmetischen 
Chirurgie” [Posthumane embodiments in a post-
gender world? Cultural dimensions of cosmetic 
surgery] (Birgid Stammberger), and a discussion 
of what is an “impairment or enhancement” dis-
cussion. In particular, Trijsje Franssen critically 
discusses the concept of enhancement proposed 
by the ethicist John Harris, which defines disabil-
ity as an unwanted and injured condition, trying 
not to refer to the “normal”.
Section four is described as trying to gener-
ate key concepts (Leitbegriffe) which could be 
useful for the ethical discussion of enhancement. 
The articles cover “Stimmungs-Enhancement” 
[Mood enhancement] (Lisa Forsberg), “Die ethi-
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sche Relevanz von Körperbildern für die En-
hancement-Debatte” [Ethical relevance of body 
images for the enhancement debate] (Annika den 
Dikken), “Alternde Gesellschaft und kognitives 
Enhancement” [Aging society and cognitive en-
hancement] (Morten Hillgaard Bülow), “Eine 
Kritik am Transhumanismus” [A criticism of 
transhumanism] (Nicolai Münch), and “Nootro-
pika, Smart Drugs und das Problem der Gover-
nance” [Nootropics, smart drugs and the problem 
of governance] (Natasha Burns).
All articles have interesting thoughts and 
should trigger good discussions within a reader 
and among readers. All articles give also food for 
thought to disability studies scholars. However, 
of particular interest to disability studies schol-
ars should be Trijsje Franssen’s article due to her 
rebuttal of John Harris’ line of arguments which 
adds to the rebuttal by others from the disability 
studies field. Christina Schües’ article should be 
of particular interest to the eco-ability scholars 
(e.g. Nocella et al. 20123) and covers the inter-
section of disabled people with animals and the 
environment. Miriam Eilers’ article should be of 
particular interest to people working on bionics 
as well as on ability expectations as the article 
links the utility of body modifications to ability 
expectations of society (e.g. productivity) which 
per se are not linked to a normative understand-
ing of health/impairment.
2 some Problems…
However, from a disability studies perspective this 
book also has some serious flaws. In the introduc-
tion of the book one reads the following: “Dieses 
Buch geht davon aus, dass die Debatte über die 
Ethik verbessernder biotechnologischer Eingriffe 
in den menschlichen Körper (‘human enhance-
ment’) durch den systematischen Einbezug der 
Perspektive und der Erfahrungen von Menschen 
mit Behinderungen konkreter wird, Grund gewinnt 
und inhaltlich bereichert wird. Zudem möchte es 
den Zusammenhang zwischen den Themenberei-
chen Enhancement und Disability Studies genauer 
erklären. Mit der These aus den Disability Studies, 
dass biomedizinische Interventionen ambivalent 
für Menschen mit Behinderungen sind, und dass 
zum Verständnis dieser Ambivalenz Erfahrungen 
von Betroffenen nötig sind, wird die ethische Sen-
sibilität verfeinert, die nötig ist, um zur Ethik von 
Enhancement umsichtig Stellung zu nehmen.” 
(p. 9) [This book assumes that the debate on the 
ethics of human enhancement through biotech-
nology will become more concrete, gain ground 
and be enriched by systematically including the 
perspective and experiences of people with disa-
bilities. It also aims to explain in more detail the 
relation between the topics of enhancement and 
disability studies. The thesis of the disability stu-
dies that biomedical interventions are ambivalent 
for people with disabilities and that it is necessary 
to include the experiences of those affected in or-
der to understand this ambivalence leads to a re-
fined ethical sensibility which is needed to give a 
cautious opinion on the ethics of enhancement.]
The problem of coverage of “disability 
studies”: One of the problems of the book is its 
use and coverage of the term disability studies. 
Nowhere is it made clear that disability studies 
is an academic field of inquiry. It also confuses 
terminology. There is no medical model of dis-
ability studies or social model of disability stud-
ies. What the authors mean, I assume, is medical 
model of disability or social model of disability.
The problem of the coverage of identity: The 
issue of identity is one main aspect of inquiry by 
disability studies scholars. Identity is also covered 
intensively in various book chapters (e.g. pp. 98–
102). Katrin Grüber writes for example: “Der 
Prozess der Identitätsbildung wird stark von der 
Fremdwahrnehmung, d. h. auch von gesellschaft-
lichen Vorstellungen beeinflusst” (p. 99) [The pro-
cess of identity formation is strongly influenced by 
the perception by others, i.e. also by social expec-
tations] and “Deshalb wird es Menschen mit Be-
hinderungen erschwert, sich selbst positiv zu defi-
nieren” (p. 99) [This makes it difficult for people 
with disabilities to define themselves positively].
Given that the problem of disabled people 
of being able to define themselves in a positive 
way especially due to the influence of societies 
views on the matter, it is rather puzzling that the 
editors take up in the introduction chapter with-
out critical reflection a definition of identity that 
is based on a negative understanding of one’s 
ability-diverse body by promoting the WHO 
definition of disability. Although the WHO defi-
nition allows for the identification of some so-
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cial factors as disabling parameters, it demands a 
body identity that is based in a deficiency model. 
As such it does not allow one to identify oneself 
in a positive way. Jackie Scully talks about vari-
ant bodies, but the WHO document highlighted 
is not about variant but deviant bodies.
It is also puzzling that the introduction char-
acterizes the difficulties of hearing parents to be 
part of the non-hearing community as discrimi-
nation of the non-disabled. This dynamic of “re-
verse discrimination” is much more complicated, 
and a lot of literature exists around identity and 
phases that lead to exclusion of others. This “re-
verse discrimination” plays itself out in quota 
systems around employment.
Finally, it is not clear what the purpose is of 
the statement: “Aber es ist nicht unwahrscheinlich, 
dass erheblich größere Inklusionsprobleme gegen-
über denjenigen auftreten können, die über bio-
technisch gesteigerte Funktionsfähigkeiten verfü-
gen.” (p. 11) [But it is not unlikely that much grea-
ter problems of inclusion may arise as compared to 
those with biotechnologically enhanced abilities.]
It is well known that people who stick out 
on the other end of the ability scales often also 
have to deal with discrimination (gifted kids…). 
This discrimination only decreases once a certain 
amount of people have the same ability or if the 
ability is seen as so useful for the purpose of other 
ability expectations that one accepts that “weird” 
ability. Indeed, one could make the point that the 
existence of normative ability expectations intrin-
sic to the negative view of a person lacking certain 
abilities (as evident in the here promoted WHO 
definition) leads to the position. Many who be-
lieve in enhancement see less abilities as impair-
ments and build an identity around the enhance-
ment. Gregory Stock stated many years ago that 
eventually there will be classes based on certain 
levels of abilities that do not relate to each other 
anymore and in the case of genetics might indeed 
become species that are genetically incompatible.
3 The Coverage of enhancement
A second set of problems is the scope of enhance-
ment covered. The book discusses whether one can 
draw a line between therapeutic enhancement and 
non-therapeutic enhancement and, in general, be-
tween therapy and enhancement, concluding that 
the line cannot be drawn. But the book is not clear 
what the consequences are for people labelled as 
impaired. The book also does not engage with the 
many different forms of enhancement (indepen-
dent of whether they are labelled as therapeutic 
or not), such as permanent enhancements, tran-
sient enhancements, genetic-based enhancements, 
drug-based enhancements, hardware-based en-
hancements, enhancements through non-invasive 
means, enhancements through invasive means, 
enhancement interventions taking place on differ-
ent levels of biological development, all of which 
are debated differently with different impacts on 
the ability of disabled people (people who are al-
ready labelled as impaired) to self-identify in a 
positive way and on their well-being.
From a disability studies perspective, differ-
ent enhancement enabling products have different 
impacts on morphology- and ability-diverse peo-
ple. To debate whether one can make a distinction 
between therapy and enhancement is a red herring 
discussion. In the end, it is about the question “why 
do we want enhancements?”. Indeed some book 
chapters question the narratives around some of 
the whys. Interestingly, the why of ability expecta-
tion of the person, the why of ableism (a term used 
by the disabled people’s rights movement since 
the 1970s), is not covered; as is not the constant 
creep in ability expectations that look for “im-
provements” of what humans can do based on non-
body-related ability expectations. Indeed the fairly 
new field of ability studies investigates the why not 
only within the framework of the body and disabil-
ity studies but beyond. It asks questions such as 
why are certain abilities expected? Why are cer-
tain abilities privileged and which abilities are ex-
pected and how are ability expectations used? This 
change in ability expectations can be achieved 
through genetic and other biological means, but it 
also is evident in the use of non-biological devices 
such as brain-machine interfaces and social robots, 
which all lead to a change in ability expectations 
which pose a problem for disabled people.
It is also troubling when the authors move 
enhancement automatically into a medical nar-
rative: “Man könnte z. B. einfach von ‘verän-
dernden’ Technologien sprechen. Damit wären 
medizinische Eingriffe gemeint, die nicht dazu 
gedacht sind zu heilen, was krank ist, sondern den 
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gegebenen Status des Körpers zu verändern.” (p. 
13) [One could. e.g. simply speak of “modifying” 
technologies. This would mean medical interven-
tions which are not intended to cure what is ill, but 
to modify the given state of the body.] If it is a me-
dical intervention, it has to be linked to a norma-
tive narrative around health, thereby changing the 
meaning of health to include such enhancements 
leading to an enhancement version of health.
From a disability studies perspective, it is also 
problematic to say: “Wie die Anwendung von En-
hancementtechnologien das tägliche Leben beein-
flussen würde, ist zudem, wenn man von einzelnen 
Beispielen absieht, heute noch kaum vorstellbar.” 
(p. 14) [How the application of enhancement tech-
nologies would influence daily life is – apart from 
a few examples – still hardly conceivable.]
It is well known how ability enhancements 
impact daily life. We have the constant examples 
of hardware used to enhance abilities of the hu-
man body. We might not know how some of the 
more down the road enhancements such as us-
ing synthetic biology and the artificial womb 
to really design genomes and grow humans or 
immortality or cyborgs as sentient beings might 
play themselves out. However, this sentence falls 
into the very trap Alfred Nordman warns about 
in his contribution. From a disability studies per-
spective one does not have to envision the daily 
life under immortality and designer genomes to 
understand how ability enhancements play them-
selves out today. Indeed, the fields of disability 
studies among others address the daily life con-
sequences of ability judgments and ability ex-
pectations and how ability expectations influence 
scientific and technological developments and 
vice versa and the interactions between humans.
4 Conclusion
Although there are many interesting and illuminat-
ing articles in the book which are worth reading, I 
posit that it fails its own stated purpose. The reader 
does not learn about the academic field of disabili-
ty studies and the reader does not gain a solid over-
view of what disability studies scholars say about 
enhancements and the different impacts different 
forms of enhancement have on ability-diverse peo-
ple who are labelled as impaired. Although there 
are some interesting articles in the book, it misses 
to mention many thoughts on enhancement from a 
disability studies perspective which has existed for 
over 15 years at least. This overview of the argu-
ments could have been dealt with within the intro-
duction, for example. It also failed to make it easier 
for ability-diverse people labelled as impaired to 
self-identify in a positive way, given that the intro-
duction of the books biases the reader toward a de-
ficiency narrative. As such, the book is more use-
ful for people who already are knowledgeable in 
disability studies and the enhancement discourse 
to read about what some colleagues think than to 
illuminate people who do not already know the 
disability studies discourse.
notes
1) The review of this book is performed through the 
lens of the academic field of disability studies. 
The reviewer has an appointment as Associate 
Professor in Community Rehabilitation and Dis-
ability Studies, University of Calgary, Alberta, 
Canada and is a Visiting Professor of Ability Ex-
pectation and Ableism Studies (short Ability Stud-
ies) at American University of Sovereign Nations 
(AUSN), Arizona, USA. He has worked for more 
than 15 years on various aspects of enhancement.
2) The reviewer uses the term disabled people because 
it is the one term used in the literature. The review-
er could also have used the term “people with dis-
abilities”. The book uses both versions “Menschen 
mit Behinderungen” und “behinderte Menschen”. 
However, whether one uses disabled people or 
people with disabilities both terms themselves are 
unclear as they cover two aspects. One aspect is 
that a person experiences a disability/disablement 
(disablism); this can originate within the body (me-
dical model of disability) or the environment (social 
model of disability). The second aspect is that it is 
used to describe the body. Here, there are also two 
options: one can follow the medical model of body 
identity, where disability is used synonymously 
with terms such as impairment, deviant, deficient, 
not normal. But one could also follow the social 
model of body identity, where the body can be seen 
as ability-diverse, as variant, as a different form of 
being (Deaf culture is one narrative where this self-
understanding of the body is evident).
3) Nocella II, A.J.; Duncan, J.M.; Bentley, J.K.C. (eds.), 
2012: Earth, Animal, and Disability Liberation: The 
Rise of the Eco-Ability Movement. New York
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